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STATE TAXATION-USE OF TAXING POWER TO ACHmEVE ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS: VERMONT TAXES GAINS REALIZED FROM TIE SALE OR
EXCHANGE OF LAND HELD LESS THAN SIX YEARS-VT. STAT. ANN. tit.

32, §§ 10001-10 (1973).

Uncontrolled speculation in land has been associated with a host of
social, economic and environmental problems including windfall profits,' skyrocketing increases in the price of land,2 increases in property
taxes, 3 depletion of open space, 4 premature and unplanned development5 and overall increases in the costs of goods and services. 6 While
land speculation schemes usually are concentrated in states with open
space and natural beauty, such as Vermont and Washington, the
recent land boom that has been sweeping the United States has removed
any boundaries on speculation; indeed, land speculation has become
7
a problem of increasing nationwide importance.
In 1973 Vermont became the first state to enact a tax applying specifically to gains realized from the sale of land.8 The tax, confined to
gains on short-term 9 land holdings and designed to control short-term
1. See L. DOWNIE, MORTGAGE ON AMERICA (1974), reviewed, Are these profits without
honor?, Bus. WEEK, May 18, 1974, at 12; A. WOLFF, UNREAL ESTATE (1973); D. Hagman, Windfall for Wipeouts 1 (1973) (unpublished manuscript on file at Washington
Law Review).
2. Since 1946, the average price of land in the United States has risen 7% per year,
while the consumer price index has risen an average of 2.7% per year. Ways, Land: The
Boom That Really Hurts,88 FORTUNE 104 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Ways].
3. See note 20 and accompanying text infra.
4. W. WHYTE, THE LAST LANDSCAPE ch. 6 (1968).
5. Id. at 17.
6. Ways, supra note 2, at 105. Speculation has also been defended as serving an
economic stabilization function in an ideal land market, and as having the capacity to
provide for the controlled and orderly release of land for development, particularly
when large parcels are held in single ownership. Elias & Gillies, Some Observations
on the Role of Speculatorsand Speculation in Land Development, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
789 (1965). For a discussion of the holding function of speculation in relation to
urban fringe development and zoning changes, see D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA
47(1971).
7. Ways, supra note 2, at 104; The New American Land Rush, TIME, Oct. 1, 1973,
at 80.
8. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 10001-10 (1973). A few countries have imposed taxes
on increases in land value or considered proposals for such a basis of taxation. Most of
the foreign experiences are summarized in Walker, Taxation of Land Value Increases,
38 TAX POLICY Nos. 8-9, at 5-10 (1971). More recently, Fiji has adopted a tax on
land sale profits in order to discourage speculation. The Fiji Times, June 15, 1972, at
1, col. 1.
9. "Short-term" in this note refers to a period of less than 6 years, which is the
cut-off line established by the tax statute. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10003 (1973). For
rate schedule, see note 17 infra.
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land speculation, promises to become a new weapon in the growing
arsenal of innovative land use measures designed to channel land
transfer and development in environmentally and socially responsible
directions. 10
This note examines the new Vermont tax, assessing its advantages
relative to more traditional land use measures. It analyzes a recent
Vermont Supreme Court decision upholding the tax' and concludes,
as did the court, that the tax is constitutionally permissible. Finally.
this note predicts the tax's future effectiveness both as a source of revenue and as a tool for regulating uncontrolled land speculation.
I.

THE VERMONT LAND GAINS TAX

The land gains tax applies to gains 12 realized from the sale or exchange of Vermont land held by the seller for less than six years.' 3: All
sales or exchanges' 4 of land are taxable, excepting the first acre or
less necessary for the use of the seller's principal residence.' 5 Only
gains on land are taxed. When realty composed of both land and
structures is sold, the gains are apportioned between the land and
structures on the basis of fair market value;' 6 that proportion attributable to structures is not taxed.
10.

For examples of other techniques for influencing land use. see F. BossEL,\IAN

& D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (Council on Environmental Quality 1971) Ihereinafter cited as Qu IFT REVOLUrION] ;Note, Property' Taxation
of Agricultural and Open Space Land, 8 HARV. J. LEGIS. 158 (1970); Costonis. Develop-

ment Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973).
II. Andrews v. Lathrop. 132 Vt. 256. 315 A.2d 860 (1974).
12. Gain is measured as a percentage of cost basis, and the statute provides that
the "provisions of the Federal Internal Revenue Code shall determine the basis (tax
cost) of land sold or exchanged." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32. § 10005(a) (1973).
13. The taxpayer is the seller, and the tax is his personal obligation. "All taxes
required to be paid or withheld under this chapter shall constitute a personal debt of
the person liable to pay or withhold the same to the state of Vermont to be recovered
in an action on this statute." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10007(d) ( 1973).
14. Contracts for the sale of land also constitute sales or exchanges, and the sale or
exchange is deemed to take place when any consideration passes to the benefit of the
seller. The transfer of an option is also considered a transfer for purposes of the tax.
Furthermore. "any sale or exchange of shares in a corporation or other entity. or of
comparable rights or property interests in any other form of organization or legal
entity, which effectively entitles the purchaser to the use or occupancy of land constitutes a sale or exchange of land." VT. SrAT. ANN. tit. 32. § 10004(c) ( 1973).
15. "Land means all land, whether or not improved, but does not include land. not
exceeding one acre, necessary for the use of a dwelling used by the taxpayer as his
principal residence. Buildings or other structures are not included in this definition of
land." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10002 (1973).
16.
d.§ 10005(b)(1973).
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Gains are taxed on a sliding-rate scale, the rate increasing directly
with percentage of profit and inversely with length of holding period.
The maximum tax rate of 60 percent is applied to a gain of 200 percent or more on land held less than one year. The minimum rate, 5
percent, applies to gains of 0-99 percent on land held between 5
and 6 years. When no gain is realized on the sale of land, or the land
7
has been held six years or more, no tax is imposed. '
The following example illustrates the operation of the tax. Suppose
that a person bought a farm with an old house on it in August 1971 for
$100,000-$90,000 of the purchase price is attributable to the land
and $10,000 to the house. Suppose further that he holds it without
using it for a residence and sells it in June 1974 for $200,000. His
total gain realized from the sale is $100,000. If $15,000 of the sale
price is attributable to the house, he realizes a gain of $5,000 on the
house, which the land gains statute does not tax; the remaining
$95,000 gain is attributable to the land and is subject to the tax. Since
the cost basis of the land was $90,000, the seller has realized more
than a 100 percent gain upon sale of the land; he also has held it for
two years but less than three. Consequently, his land gain is taxed at a
30 percent rate, and he pays $28,500.
A.

Regulatory Objectives of the Land Gains Tax

The tax serves both regulatory and revenue-gathering functions.' 8
As a regulatory measure it is designed to curb short-term land speculation by limiting the profits available from short-term land sales and

17.

Id. § 10003 ( 1973) specifies tax rates as follows:
Years land held by
transferor
0 99%

Gain, as a percentage
of basis
I00-199%
200%or more

Less than I year

30%

45%

60%

I year, but less than 2
2 years, but less than 3
3 years, but less than 4
4 years, but less than 5

25%
20%
15%
10%

37.5%
30%
22.5%
15%

50%
40%
30%
20%

5%

7.5%

10%

5 years, but less than 6

The basic scheme of the tax is largely the work of Norris Hoyt, Legal Counsel to the
Governor of Vermont. It received unexpected popular support in the 1972 political
elections in the state. See note 32 infra.
18. See text accompanying notes 38-42 infra,for a discussion ofthe revenue-gathering

ing function of the tax.
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hence discouraging rapid turnover of land. This objective is deemed
desirable because of the problems resulting from uncontrolled
short-term speculation: increased land prices and property taxes, accelerated and inefficient development, loss of community aesthetic
wealth and windfall profits.
1. The problem of increased land prices and property taxes
When a picturesque and relatively undeveloped community is "discovered," speculators offer higher prices than the land would otherwise bring on the local market in order to induce owners to sell. Land
prices spiral upward as more and more parcels in a community are
sold to speculators,9 pulling property taxes up with them. 20 As a result, local residents in rural areas may be unable to buy or maintain
land in their own communities; only speculators, developers and
wealthy "outsiders" may be able to afford rural land. The land gains
tax should decrease levels of speculative activity by sharply limiting
the potential rewards from short-term speculation, thus counteracting
this upward spiral in land prices and property taxes.
2. The problem of acceleratedand inefficient development
Short-term speculative activity often hastens the conversion of farm
and open space land to developed use. This occurs because of the
speculators' extensive use of borrowed money in purchasing land.2 1 The
combination of high interest payments and property taxes together
with the incentive to turn a profit places enormous pressures on such
speculators either to seek a developer-buyer or to subdivide and sell
the lots themselves as soon as possible,2 2 thus accelerating the conver-

19.

W\i) i._upra
.note 4. at 104.

20. Theoretically, a community could decrease its property tax rate as assessed
valuation of property increased and still maintain the same return from the property
tax. Consequently, an increase in property valuation in a community as a result of
speculative purchases should not cause property tax increases, since the tax rate ought
to decrease as the valuation increases. However, a less than exhaustive search has not
revealed any instances of a local unit of government decreasing its tax rate under such
circumstances, and in fact it is commonly accepted that a rise in valuation brings a
rise in property taxes. See WIIYTE, .upra note 4, at 104: Property Taxation of Agri-

cultural and Open Space Land, supra note 10. at 159.
21. Vermont Times. July 1973, at 5, col. 2.
22.
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sion of open land to developed use. The growth resulting from this
hasty development often occurs prior to implementation of appropriate planning measures, straining the capacities of local communities
or governmental bodies to accommodate it.23 The Vermont land gains
tax attempts to inhibit this hasty development by discouraging shortterm speculation.
The distinction between short-term and long-term land speculation
is critical to an understanding of this problem. The traditional justification for land speculation, that it serves to withhold land from the
24
market and thus prevents premature and disorderly development, is
valid, if at all, only in the case of long-term speculation. Only in the
long-term situation is there actually a "withholding" of the land from
the market until the demand for its development is well established.
When land is held for short periods, speculation may effect an opposite result-promoting untimely and unplanned development-because the financing arrangements of short-term holdings tend to force
early development. This premature development may conflict with
other social policies, particularly in those rural areas where preserving
the pastoral quality of the landscape is a recognized social goal. 2 5 In
this situation, the shorter the holding period the greater the likelihood
of significant social costs (e.g., premature development, accelerated
conversion and increased land prices and property taxes), and the
smaller the likelihood of any corresponding benefit. 2 6 As the holding
period increases, the likelihood that speculation may serve a beneficial
purpose increases because land is being withheld from the market
over time. One strength of the Vermont tax is that its rate schedule
reflects this relationship: The tax burden decreases with the length
of time the land is held.

23.

At a news conference following passage of the land gains tax, Governor Thomas

Salmon of Vermont noted these effects and indicated that a purpose of the gains tax
was to slow down the rate of speculation so as to minimize them. Record of Hearing,
July 5, 1973, Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256. 315 A.2d 860 (1974).
24. See note 6 supra.
25. The Vermont legislature has explicitly stated that it is a state policy to "protect
and preserve the historic features of the Vermont landscape ... and ... to encourage
and enhance the attractiveness of the Vermont scene." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4302(4)
(Supp. 1973).
26. For a discussion of the relationship between the social costs and benefits of
private activities, see Bell, The Coming of Post Industrial Society, Bus. & Soc'v REV.
INNOVATION 5, 22-23 (Spring 1973).
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3. Loss of community aesthetic wealth
In areas where it is in the public interest to preserve land in a pastoral state,2 7 the aesthetic qualities of an undeveloped community represent a significant part of its "collective wealth." 2 8 The "tragedy of
the commons" model ' ' helps to explain how imperfectly functioning
market forces cause the destruction of this community wealth. According to this model, each time open land is sold for development
purposes, the pastoral character of the community, and thus some of
its collective wealth, is diminished. Although an individual seller realizes a gain, the concomitant loss of pastoral qualities and rural open
space is imposed on all persons in the community. 30 Individuals thus
are encouraged to speculate in land because they can realize a private
gain without having to bear more than a fraction of the resulting
public costs. The cumulative result may be the depletion of the rural
or pastoral amenities of the community-the very qualities which
comprised part of its original wealth. The Vermont tax attempts to
recapture a portion of the landseller's gain to compensate the public
for costs the seller could otherwise "externalize" or impose on society
generally.
4. The windfall profits problem
While the concept of windfall profits is difficult to define precisely. it
is generally used to refer to a gain which exceeds what prevailing standards of economic morality suggest is a fair return from a particular

27. See note 25 supra.
28. This aesthetic portion of its collective wealth may also constitute an economic
resource. The tourism industry in Vermont has relied heavily on the fact that a historic
rural New England landscape has heretofore been preserved in large areas of the state.
29. Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Connons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). The "commons"
referred to is the common grazing ground for cows found in English villages in the
19th Century. Each farmer received a benefit in bringing his cows to the commons to
graze, and because no individual costs were imposed on him, he was encouraged to
bring in more cows. Yet the same amount of common ground could not continue to
support increased numbers of cows: the commons became worthless as grazing land. In
other words, where there is a common good that can be used by many at no cost to
each individually, the good is apt to become overused to the extent that its value
for everyone is destroyed. Hardin uses this theory to explain how certain forms of
modern environmental degradation, such as air pollution, came about.
30. Even if the speculator owns other land in the community which he plans to
sell, his individual loss is only a small fraction of the community's loss.
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investment or activity.31 Windfall gain is judged "excessive" by reference to two criteria: the amount of capital or labor expended in the
investment or activity, and the amount of social benefit arising from
that activity. By the first criterion, a gain is unjustified when it is unearned; by the second, it is unjustified when it is realized without corresponding public benefit, or perhaps at the public expense. 32 This
second criterion has been discussed; 33 the first presents a further

policy justification for subjecting speculative gains to regulation and
recapture.
In a speculative land market, land profits often include an "unearned increment"-an increase in value not attributable to the seller's efforts but to events outside his control. 34 These increases are
often called socially created 35 or governmentally created 36 values; typical urban and suburban examples are property value increases due to
nearby construction of transit stops or sewer lines. In a rural setting,
an increase in value may be created by the existence of undeveloped
land or a pastoral landscape at a time of increased demand for rural

recreational land. A major goal of land value increment taxation, of
which the Vermont tax is but one example, is to minimize this unearned
increment or recapture it so that it may inure to the benefit of society
37
generally rather than solely to individuals.

3 1. C. SHOUP, FACING THE TAX PROBLEM 271 (Twentieth Century Fund 1937).
32. It is these aspects of land speculation which may account for the high level
of public interest in the tax in Vermont and its notable influence on electoral politics

in the state. The election of Governor Thomas Salmon was generally considered as a
popular mandate in favor of the gains tax and the property tax relief plan, discussed
at note 40 and accompanying text infra. Boston Sunday Globe, Nov. 19, 1972, at 33,
47; Rutland Herald, Jan. 10, 1973, at 1.
33. See text accompanying notes 24-30 supra.
34. See generally Taxation of Land Value Increases,supra note 8.
35. Id. at 10.
36. D. Hagman, supra note I, at 5. Professor Hagman is undertaking an extensive
study, funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, of both the
windfall and "wipeout" effects on land values of the imposition of land use controls.
Letter from Donald G. Hagman to Peter R. Teachout, April 8, 1974.
37. In 1967 Great Britain adopted a land value increment tax, called a "betterment
levy," for the precise purpose of recapturing gain attributable to the development
value of land as distinguished from its value in current use. After the Conservative
government took office in 1970, the provisions were changed: The value increment
became subject to the ordinary capital gains tax and the rate of tax was reduced from
40% to a maximum of 30%. Taxation of Land Value Increases, supra note 8, at 9.
While the Vermont land gains is a type of land value increment tax, such a tax need
not necessarily be imposed at the event of land transfer but could also be imposed at
specified intervals. Id. at 11.

1165

Washington Law Review
B.

Vol. 49: 1159, 1974

The Revenue-Gathering Objective of the Land Gains Tax

Though land market regulation is a primary purpose of the tax, an
equally important objective is to generate revenue for implementation
of other state programs. At present, revenue from the tax provides
funding for the preparation of statewide property tax maps3 8 and partially supports a property tax relief program for landowners with lim39
ited income.
As a revenue generating device, this tax creates an entirely new
basis of state taxation. Those who realize short-term profit from
short-term land sales are singled out to help bear the costs of selected
governmental services and programs. The adoption of this tax furthers
two important tax policies within Vermont: It allows the economically
marginal landholder to be partly relieved of the property tax burden,
and it increases the state's taxing power over gains from sales of land
by nonresidents.
The land gains tax in Vermont is coordinated with a tax relief plan
which incorporates features of progressive taxation. Any resident
landowner who pays more than a specified percent of his annual income for property taxes on his house and two acres of land becomes
eligible for a refund of the excess paid. 4° The relief scheme therefore
represents a partial shift in state tax policy away from the assumption
that ownership of land bears a direct relationship to an ability or obligation to pay. This shift has a major impact in a state such as Vermont whose residents include many economically marginal farmers,
because it relieves this class of taxpayers of part of the burden of
public finance.
The land gains tax permits this relief for marginal landholders by
extending the tax burden to another class of taxpayers: those who
speculate in Vermont land. While not all land speculators are out41
of-staters, 30 percent of all Vermont land is held by nonresidents.
These persons or entities do not earn their principal income in the

38. The first $500,000 collected each fiscal year is reserved for this purpose. No. 81.
§ 10, [1973] Vt. Acts 238.
39. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5976(a) (Supp. 1973).
40. The applicable percentage is determined by the amount of the owner's income.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5967(a) (Supp. 1973). The maximum refund allowable is
$500. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5 9 68(a)(2) (Supp. 1973).
41. New York Times, May 27, 1973, § 8 (Real Estate), at 1,col. 5 (quoting Governor
Thomas Salmon of Vermont).

1166

Land Gains Tax
state, so the capital gains provisions of the state income tax provide
only a limited means of reaching their gains from land sales; yet they
stand to profit considerably from their sales of Vermont land while
imposing costs on the state.4 2 If Vermont were to increase its income
tax rate, the higher taxes would not affect these nonresidents but would
fall entirely on state residents. By adopting the land gains tax, the state
has increased its power to tax those whose sales of land give them a
clear capacity to pay-whether they are state residents or not-at a
time when they have liquid assets available for taxation.
C.

Relation to Other Forms of Land Use Taxation and Regulation

Imposition of the land gains tax represents a different approach to
land use control than is found in regulatory and taxation schemes currently in operation in other states. One device commonly used in other
states is a "use-value assessment" scheme, 4 3 a form of preferential assessment, whereby farmland or other open land is assessed for property tax purposes at its "use" value (economic value in agricultural
production) rather than its "market" value (the price it would bring on
the market, often for subdivision or development purposes). The purpose of this scheme is to relieve farmers or other holders of open
space land from the pressure to sell because of an inability to pay
taxes based on market value assessment. 44 In some states, a use-value
assessment scheme is supplemented with a tax "rollback" provision
which provides an additional disincentive to accelerated development
45
of agricultural or open space land.
42.
43.

See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
See generally Property Taxation of Agricultural and Open Space Land, supra

note 10.
44.

Statistics indicate the problem faced by farmers. Between 1950 and 1967 net

farm income in Vermont increased 47%, the value of real estate increased 59%, and
property taxes increased 123%. R. Sinclair, Property Taxes and Rural Landowners
(Vt. Agricultural Experiment Station Bull. MP 55, January 1969). Although Vermont
has not adopted a use-value assessment scheme, apparently local assessors are currently
valuing farmland at agricultural level or below, so that a de facto use plan for farm-

land does exist in the state. The current administration believes that the enactment
of an official plan might actually require the assessed value of farmland to be increased,

and is therefore reluctant to introduce such a proposal. Interview with Norris Hoyt,
Legal Counsel to the Governor of Vermont, in Norwich, Vt., Dec. 2, 1973.
Use assessment is most frequently applied to agricultural land, but many states also
use it to retard development in open space and timberland. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
ch. 84.34 (Supp. 1973).
45. Under such a provision, should an owner who has been paying property taxes

at use assessment levels change the use of his land, or sell it for a different use, he must

1167

Washington Law Review

Vol. 49: 1159, 1974

The Vermont land gains tax performs much the same function as a
use-value assessment scheme 46 but offers a number of advantages over
that approach. For example, the land gains tax applies to all
short-term sales of land for gain in the state. By contrast, a use-value
assessment scheme may affect only the handful of landowners whose
land is held in specified uses and who elect to participate according to
statutory procedures. 47 Since the Vermont land gains tax applies to
sales of all land and can be avoided only by selling at no profit or by
holding land for six years or more, its inhibiting impact on development is apt to be broader. Second, the use-value scheme may reduce a
farmer's property taxes but does not discourage speculators from continuing to offer irresistably high prices for land. 48 By contrast, the land
gains tax is specifically designed to discourage speculation by taxing
short-term gains and to provide a check on the prices offered for land.
Finally, the land gains tax generates revenue for the state, whereas a
use-value assessment plan results in reduced revenues for the local
units of government financed by the property tax.
Planning and regulation at state, local and regional levels is perhaps the most common land use control technique. 49 Vermont has
been a leader in working out a comprehensive scheme of statewide
land use planning and regulation.5 0° To date, however, the primary
repay the amount of "'deferred" taxes: the difference between the property tax on his
land calculated on the basis of market value and what he actually paid on the basis of
use assessment valuation. He may also be required to pay interest on the deferred
taxes or a penalty or both. In many states, the rollback provision only applies to deferred taxes for two or three years preceding the sale, and no payment of interest is
required. See Appendix to Property Taxation of Agricultural and Open Space Land,
.supra note 10. at 160. for a summary of state provisions. An unusually severe rollback
provision is found in the Washington scheme, which may require payment of deferred
taxes for up to 20 years preceding a sale of timberland, and 14 years preceding sales of
other land. It also imposes a penalty of 2 0C of the total of deferred taxes plus interest.
WASh. RI V. C'ODI § 84.34.080 (Supp. 1973).
46. See text accompanying notes 21-26 supra.
47. Carman & Poison, Tax Shifts Occurring as a Result o1 Differential Assessment of
Farmland: California, 1968-69, 24 NAT'L TAX J. 499, 455 (197 1).
48. See Property Taxes and Rural Landowners. note 44 supra, for the view that Vermont farmers often explain sales of their land in terms of high taxes when in fact other
reasons, including the attractive offers made to them for their farms. may be more significant.
49. See QtUI I RI-VOI 0 IION, sitpra note 10: A Molmi LAND DI-Vi OPMEN I CODE
(Tent. Draft Nos. 2-5. 1970-73).
50. The scheme originated in the 1970 legislation known as "'Act 250.'" VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10. §§ 6001-91 (1973). The Act provided for the adoption of overall regulatory and planning objectives, the creation of an administrative agency, and the establishment of a permit system for development projects. In 1972. the legislature enacted
specific standards with which development proposals mtust comply before they can be

Land Gains Tax
effect of the Vermont land use control scheme, known popularly as
"Act 250," has been to ensure that development projects undertaken
in the state are environmentally responsible rather than to limit the
rate and scope of development activity. Applications for development
must be approved by an administrative commission, but few are rejected and the majority are approved on condition that further specified environmental safeguards are incorporated into the development
plans. 5 1 In other words, regulation has served primarily to "environmentalize" rather than to inhibit development. The Vermont land
gains tax, on the other hand, is designed to inhibit the level of pre52
development speculation and conversion of land to developed uses.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL PERMISSIBILITY

Immediately after enactment of the land gains tax in Vermont, a
suit was filed to challenge its constitutionality. The plaintiffs alleged
that the tax was unconstitutional on several grounds, primarily because the statutory distinction between those taxed and untaxed was
alleged to be a discriminatory classification which violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.5 3 The trial court decision

approved. For a thorough description of the early stages and objectives of Act 250, see
QUIET REVOLUTION, stupra note 10, at 54-107. For a report on the second stage, see Levy,
Vermnont's New Approach to Land Development, A.B.A.J. 1158 (1973). A projected
third stage would involve the adoption of a statewide comprehensive plan which
would leave some degree of discretion to planners at local levels.
5 I. Vernont's New Approach to Land Development, supra note 50, at 1159.
52. Theoretically, adoption of effective planning and supplemental regulation would
obviate the necessity for curbing speculation by a land gains tax; dealers in land would
be guided by knowledge of permissible uses for particular parcels and the market value
of land for those uses. See Elias & Gillies, sutpra note 6. at 797, for the view that availability of such information is conducive to beneficial functioning of speculation. But cf.
Ways. supra note 2, at 170. wherein the author claims that restrictions on some land
tend to drive up values of less restricted land. Doubt has been expressed, however, that
planning and regulation can ever be adequate by themselves to achieve these objectives.
Development Rights Transfer, supra note 10, at 75. To the extent that planning does
not exist or is not effective, a land gains tax may provide a check on speculative activity and on the forced conversion of land to developed use.
53. Brief for Appellant at I, Andrews v. Lathrop, 132 Vt. 256, 315 A.2d 860 (1974).
Constitutional violation was also alleged on the grounds that (1) the gains tax violates
the equal protection clause by discriminating against nonresident landsellers because
they are not eligible to participate in the property tax relief program which they
must support; (2) the tax places an unconstitutional additional burden on a landowner who must also pay a capital gains tax on the sale of property; and (3) the statute was enacted in violation of a Vermont constitutional provision which requires revenue bills to originate in the House of Representatives.
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sustaining the tax was affirmed by the Vermont Supreme Court in Andrews v. Lathrop.5 4 The court held that promotion of a state policy of

deterring land speculation is a permissible legislative purpose and that
the statutory classification used to determine those land sales to be taxed
is rationally related to this purpose. The court further held that
superimposing the land gains tax on existing state and federal capital
gains taxes does not result in unconstitutional double taxation. 5 5 Although the court could have applied a somewhat more rigorous equal
protection analysis, its decision in Andrews to uphold the tax was
56
undoubtedly correct.
Two other constitutional questions concerning the tax were not presented to the court but should be noted in evaluating the constitutionality of land gains taxation: whether the tax results in a "taking"
of property without compensation in violation of the due process
clause, and whether the tax denies due process by retroactively taxing
57
land value increases which accrued prior to its enactment.
A.

Equal Protection

The plaintiffs charged in Andrews that the tax violates the equal
protection clause by discriminating arbitrarily between those land
54. 132 Vt. 256. 315 A.2d 860(1974).
55. The court also held that the plaintiffs had failed to introduce evidence showing discrimination against nonresident landsellers. 132 Vt. at 260. 315 A.2d at 863. See
note 53 .stpra.Finally. it held that the tax was not enacted in violation of a state constitutional requirement that revenue measures originate in the House of Representatives.
VT. CONST. ch. II, § 6. The gains tax was added to the property tax relief bill during a
House-Senate conference session after the House had rejected a gains tax proposal.
The court held that the whole bill, which included both the land gains tax and the
property relief program (see note 40 supra) was not a revenue bill within the meaning
of the constitutional provision because its primary purpose was to provide property tax
relief, and the tax was intended primarily to support the tax relief program. In this
context the purpose of deterring speculation was considered secondary. 132 Vt. at 265.
315 A.2d at 866.
56. See text accompanying notes 64-70 infra.
57. State tax laws must also comply with state constitutional requirements. In particular, the different versions of the "uniformity clause" found in many state constitutions impose standards for tax laws which may be more restrictive than those of the
fourteenth amendment. For a description of the various uniformity clauses in use in the
states and the judicial interpretations of their requirements. see W. NEWUOUSE. CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION (1959). Recently many states

have been amending their constitutions to delete uniformity clauses in order to have
greater flexibility in devising new ways of increasing revenue. A. STURM, MODERNIZING
STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1973). Vermont's version of a uniformity clause, found in VT.
CONST. ch. I, art. 9. has been held equal in effect to the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Clark v. City of Burlington, 101 Vt. 391, 143 A. 677 (1928).
Consequently its clause imposes no independent state requirements.
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sellers who have held land for less than six years and those who have
held land for six years or more. The usual equal protection test is
whether statutory classification is reasonably related to a legitimate
government purpose. 58 A challenger normally may show a violation by
demonstrating either that the legislative purpose is impermissible or
that the statutory discrimination between classes of citizens is not rationally related to a concededly permissible purpose.5 9 However, the
Supreme Court has developed a special approach to review of state
tax classifications under the equal protection clause, giving special
deference to such classifications because of the legislature's superior
familiarity with local conditions and with the policy justifications for
distinguishing between classes of taxpayers. In tax cases the Court
hesitates to redraw lines established by state legislatures and will uphold a tax law unless the challenger is able to negate every conceiv60
able basis on which it might be sustained.
The Andrews court began its equal protection analysis by identifying the purpose of the tax as "the deterrence of land speculation." 6 1
It found this purpose permissible because of "the increasing concern
within the State over the use and development of land as a natural
resource," and noted that "[s] peculation falls within the ambit of such
concern as a land use; indeed it has a bearing on many other uses to
which the land might be put."' 62 The court then determined that this
58.

See generallyTussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CALIF.

L. REV. 341, 344-53 (1949), and cases cited therein.
59. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1077-87 (1969).
60. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940). Three cases decided within the

past year demonstrate the Court's firm adherence to this standard of review in state
tax matters. In Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973), the
Court relied on the policy of deferral to the state legislature in upholding an Illinois constitutional provision subjecting corporations and similar entities but not individuals to a personal property tax. In San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court found no violation of equal protection in the
Texas scheme of financing public education by property taxes where the result was that

more money was available per child in some areas of the state than in others. The
majority quoted from Madden and stated that since there were no clear alternatives,

the Court would defer to the legislature's efforts to find a workable scheme of education
finance. 411 U.S. at 40-41. In Kahn v. Shevin, 94 S. Ct. 1734 (1974), the Court upheld

a Florida tax law allowing a $500 annual exemption from the property tax for widows
but not for widowers. It deferred to the legislature's judgment that the impact of loss
of support caused by the death of a spouse is greater on widows than on widowers.
Justice Douglas noted that the principle of allowing the states large leeway in making

tax classifications "has weathered nearly a century of Supreme Court adjudication, and
it applies here as well." Id. at 1737.
61.
132Vt.at261,315A.2dat863.
62. Id.
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purpose was rationally related to the tax classification based on length
63
of the holding period:
The tax places a burden on short-term ownership and on high profits
in the resale of lands, two attributes of property ownership closely
linked to the holding of land for speculative purposes. The taxing of
short-term ownership as opposed to long-term ownership and the
taxing of short-term ownership at a higher rate, is integral to the deterrent effect. No other objective of property ownership is so directly
affected as is land speculation.

In reality, the tax's purpose is a bit more complex than the Vermont court's analysis indicates. The land gains tax is intended to curb
speculation, but it also serves a broad range of other objectives: to
provide for property tax relief; to establish a new source of state revenue; and, as discussed in Part I of this note, to reduce or stabilize the
market price of land," 4 prevent increases in property taxes due to increases in speculative values of land,"5 discourage transactions which
tend to force premature conversion of open land to developmental
use, and reduce the divergence between the public benefit and public
costs of short-term speculation."6 Taxation of such gains also promises
to recapture unearned increases in land values for the benefit of society 6 7 and to minimize the destruction of the aesthetic wealth of the
8

community."
Characterization of the tax's purpose as simply "the deterrence of
speculation" is thus both overbroad and overnarrow. It is too broad
because the tax does not seek to deter all speculation but only that
based on short-term holdings. It is too narrow in that "deterrence of
speculation" is not the ultimate purpose of the act; its real objective is
to discourage the harmful impact of speculation on economic and
land use problems within the state. "Deterrence of speculation"-or
more precisely, deterrence of short-term speculation-is simply a
policy which the state has adopted as a means of combatting several
more narrowly defined problems; for example, the rapidly spiralling
increases in land prices and property taxes and conversion of open
63.

Id. at 262. 315 A.2d at 864.

64.

See note 19 and accompanying text supra.

65.

See note 20 and accompanying text sufpra.

66.
67.

See note 26 and accompanying text sitpra.
See note .7 and accompanying text .ipra.

68.

See note 29 and accompanying text vipra.
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land to developed use. The act's underlying purpose is to alleviate
these problems.
These specific regulatory objectives seem to be valid exercises of the
police power and thus permissible objectives for a tax statute under
the equal protection clause; some are closely related to the objectives
of existing legislation designed to deal with similar problems.6 9
Once the purposes of the tax are found permissible, the equal protection test also requires a rational relation between at least one of
these purposes and the classification imposed by the taxing schemein this case between short-term and long-term land gains. The relation
is rational if the classification causes the tax burden to fall most
heavily on those activities which cause or aggravate the problems the
statute seeks to alleviate. Viewed in this perspective, a distinction between taxation of short-term and long-term land gains is justifiable. The
land gains tax was enacted to curb not land speculation per se, but the
harmful results of speculation. Since the harmful results are largely a
consequence of short-term holding periods,7 0 taxation of gains only
from short-term land sales is reasonably related to this objective.
Given the conclusion that the distinction between long and
short-term gains is constitutionally valid, there remains the question of
whether six years is a permissible point at which to differentiate between the two. Justice Holmes commented on the problem of linedrawing in an influential dissent to a state taxation decision: "[W] hen
it is seen that a line or point there must be, and that there is no
mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the
legislature must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide of
any reasonable mark."''r Justice Holmes' position urging deference to
69. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.Note, however, that a regulatory
measure, the purpose of which is to place an absolute limitation on development, may
be constitutionally impermissible. In Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v.
The City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 IN.D. Cal. 1974), a federal district court in
California held that a city which desired to protect its small town character could not
legally control its growth rate by limiting the number of building permits it would

issue, because such a limitation inhibits the constitutional right of interstate travel.

Compare Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d
291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972). appeal denied, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). in which an 18year plan for population growth was upheld because the town intended to direct
growth, not to prevent it. The Vermont land gains tax is designed to slow down develop-

ment by means of increasing the costs of the land speculation that accompanies it, but

the tax does not flatly prohibit either speculation or development.
70. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
71. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32,41(1928) (Holmes, J., dis-

senting). The Court held that an exemption from a tax on the recording of mortgages
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legislative line-drawing is today's orthodoxy,7 2 and one of the major
bases of the Court's policy of deference to the legislatures in state taxation matters. The plaintiffs in Andrews offered no evidence that six
years is "wide of the mark" in achieving the state's goal, and therefore
73
the six year provision was properly sustained.
B.

Due Process: Confiscation

A landseller may allege that the effect of a land gains tax such as
Vermont's is to "take" his property without due process of law. This
charge, based on the fourteenth amendment, is the state equivalent of
a claim of confiscation without compensation against the federal government under the fifth amendment. The Vermont land gains tax offers two possible bases for this complaint: confiscation of a landowner's property interest in the value of land, and confiscation of his
business interests. The Andrews plaintiffs raised both points in their
complaint, but pursued only a general claim of unconstitutional
1
"double taxation" on appeal.

4

If a regulatory measure causes a diminution of value or investment
potential of property, it is considered a "taking" without compensation only if the degree of regulation has gone "too far" and has effectively deprived an owner of all profitable uses of land. 75 Although the
was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause, where only those mortgages
maturing within 5 years were exempted. The majority of the Court determined that
the distinction between short and long mortgages was arbitrary and discriminatory.
The Court stated that if the state "had reversed the process and taxed indebtedness
maturing within a shorter period than five years, and exempted such as matured in a
larger period, the inequality probably would be readily conceded, but the constitutional
infirmity, though more strikingly apparent, would have been the same." Id. at 39. The
decision was 5-4 and strong dissents were written by Justices Holmes and Brandeis. who
observed that the Court should not interfere with the judgment of the state legislature
if a legislative purpose could be identified. Justice Holmes acknowledged a basis for
the distinction in that 5 year and longer mortgages usually involved large transactions
of the business world, whereas the shorter ones were generally home improvement
loans to individuals.
72. 132 Vt. at 263. 315 A.2d at 864.
73. Id.
74. Brief for Appellant at 2. Andrews v. Lathrop. 132 Vt. 256. 315 A.2d 860(1974).
75. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The opinion in this case
established a balancing test for determining when regulation results in unconstitutional "taking" under the fifth amendment: The private loss to the landowner must be
balanced against the public value of the regulatory measure. I ANDERSON. AMERICAN
LAW OF ZONING § 2.21 (1968). For a recent discussion of the constitutional limits of
land use regulation tnder the fifth amendment, see F. Bossil MAN. D. C.L! ILS & J.
BANIA. Till TAKIN, Issut(1973). The authors take the position that Penn.Nvh'ania
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land gains tax inhibits the potential of a Vermont landowner to profit
from the sale of his land within a six year holding period, it does not
restrict the physical uses to which the property may be put, and it does
not restrict the owner's ability to hold the land as a long-term investment since there are no limitations on the sale of land after six years. It
is doubtful that the expectation of short-term profit would be considered
a property right protected by the due process clause where there is no
interference with physical use or where there are alternate nontaxable
76
means of disposing of the land.
Although speculators might argue that the state has confiscated
their business interests, since their profits may be dissipated by the
cumulative effect of state and federal income taxes and the land gains
tax, the Supreme Court held in Ft. Smith Lumber Co. v. Arkansas
that the fourteenth amendment does not forbid cumulative taxation
per se. 77 Furthermore, the Court held in the leading case of A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton that if the state has the power to levy a tax, and
if the tax is based on a legitimate policy determination rather than an
arbitrary intention to drive certain persons out of business, the taxation of business profits at high rates does not amount to a taking without compensation in violation of the fourteenth amendment.7 8 Under
the Magnano standard, persons who engage in speculative land investments in Vermont undertake the risk that their profits may be taxed
and therefore cannot complain of a due process violation.
C.

Due Process:Retroactivity

A statute creating a tax designed to operate retroactively may offend due process if the effect of the retroactivity is harsh.7 9 This issue
Coal should be overruled and its balancing test replaced by a "strict" construction of

the taking clause---"that a regulation of the use of land, if reasonably related to a valid

public purpose, can never constitute a taking." Id. at 238.
76. The strong element of a transfer tax in the land gains tax should also be noted.

The Supreme Court has held that a transfer tax is not a tax on a property interest
since it taxes the event of transfer and not the property directly. United States v. Manufacturer's National Bank of Detroit, 363 U.S. 194 (1960).

77. 251 U.S. 532, 533 (1920), cited in Andrews, 132 Vt. at 264, 315 A.2d at 865.
78. 292 U.S. 40 (1934). A tax on butter substitutes which destroyed the appellant's margarine business was held not to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. "Those who enter upon a business take . . . [the] risk" that the
business may be effectively destroyed by high taxation. 292 U.S. at 46.

79.

Untermeyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928). A retroactive tax on gifts

made prior to enactment without notice of the tax was found to result in a denial of
due process.
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was not raised by the Andrews appellants, but because the Vermont
tax law took effect shortly after enactment, on all subsequent transfers
of land, it may be argued that it violates due process by providing for
taxation of the profit increment that had accrued prior to enactment
of the tax.
The United States Supreme Court has held that retroactivity alone
does not make a tax unconstitutional since taxation is not a penalty
but a means of allocating costs of government among those who enjoy
public benefits.8 0 As long as the power to tax could have been exercised during the retroactive period, 8 1 retroactive taxation is not unconstitutional unless under the circumstances its effect is "harsh and
oppressive." 82 In Welch v. Henry, the Court upheld a 1935 Wisconsin
statute retroactively taxing 1933 corporate dividends, distinguishing
between permissible retroactive property and income taxation, and
impermissible retroactive gift taxation. In the former case, the Court
reasoned, the property owner must expect to bear a tax burden; but in
the latter, a person is taxed on the basis of a voluntary event which, at
the time, he reasonably could not have anticipated to be taxable.8 3
Hence, a tax on income from land sales could be imposed retroactively,
unlike one on gifts, since land transactions are events which one reasonably might expect to be taxed.
Furthermore, the Vermont land gains tax applies only to gains on
sales of land after the effective date of the statute. Because no gain is
realized until the transfer (which must occur after the effective date of
the statute in order to be taxed), strictly speaking the tax has no retroactive effect at all. 84 Even conceding a retroactive effect, since it ap80. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938). See text accompanying note 83 infra.
81.
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. I(1916).
82. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938).
83. Id. at 146-47.
84. For the federal income tax, the rule is that an increase in the value of an asset which occurs prior to the effective date of a tax statute does not become "gain"
until received as income regardless of whether or not the appreciation accrued before or after the enactment of the tax. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). Cf.
Thorpe v. Mlahin. 43 Ill. 2d 36, 250 N.E.2d 633 (1969) (per curiam). noted in 64
Nw. U.L. Rr.v. 886 95 (1969). The Illinois Supreme Court held that for the purposes of a newly enacted capital gains tax, the taxable value of property acquired
prior to August I, 1969, the effective date of the tax, would be limited to the market
value determined as of that date. However, the case may be distinguished because the
decision was based on the intent of the legislature rather than on constitutional principles of due process. Consequently the decision does not conflict with the Eisner
rule. But cf.Comment, The Validity of Pennsylvania's Taxation of Net Gains Derived
from Dispositions of Property, 76 DICK. L. REv. 555, 568-75 (1972). The writer ex-
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plies to unrealized appreciation in land value which accrued prior to
enactment, a landowner could have avoided the tax completely by
selling in the interim between enactment of the land gains tax and its
effective date. Speculators can also avoid the tax by holding the land
for six years. Because of these alternatives, taxation of unrealized appreciation accruing prior to the effective date of the land gains tax does
not appear to result in a "harsh and oppressive" effect violative of due
process.
III. THE LAND GAINS TAX IN OPERATION
A.

The Tax as a Revenue-Raising Device

The Vermont tax has been generating about $100,000 per month
(after a slow start the first two months), and is expected to yield at
least $1,000,000, and perhaps $1,500,000, by the end of its first fiscal
year of operation. 85 By comparison, the general income tax in Vermont
yielded $52,695,000 in revenue in the fiscal year ending in 1972
(33.3 percent of total state revenue), the sales and use tax yielded
$21,566,000 (13 percent of total), and the realty transfer tax yielded
$1,662,000 (1.1 percent of total).8" Thus, the Vermont land gains
tax may become as powerful as the state's property transfer tax in generating public revenue.
B.

The Tax as a Regulatory Device

Early reports indicated the tax had at least an initial psychological
effect in discouraging speculation. One speculator reported that after
the tax was enacted, he could no longer interest previous investment
partners in Vermont land and therefore was turning his efforts to
neighboring New Hampshire. 87 Four months after enactment, the
presses the view that Pennsylvania's personal income tax law should be construed
to limit the period of retroactivity on property gains to the effective date of the

statute, as was done in Illinois, in order to avoid constitutional invalidity on grounds
of retroactivity.
85. Interview with Robert G. Lathrop, Commissioner of Taxes, State of Vermont,
in Montpelier, Vermont, December 10, 1973. According to Mr. Lathrop, the tax was

not designed as a high-yield measure but is generating revenue effectively on the scale
at which it was drafted.

U 875, 880 (1973).

86.

CCH STATE TAX GUIDE (2d ed.)

87.

Vermont Times, July 1973, at 5, col. 2.
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head of the Vermont Real Estate Commission said that without ques88
tion out-of-state speculation in Vermont land had "dried up."
If the cost of carrying charges on the large amounts borrowed to
finance land investments compels early sale, so that the tax applies,
and investors are unwilling to purchase land on which they will be
taxed at resale, 8 9 then application of the tax may decrease the level of
short-term speculative activity. Even if speculators adjust their
financing so they can hold land for six years before selling, the rate of
land turnover may be reduced and the problems resulting from shortterm speculation may be partially dissipated.
The effectiveness of the tax as a deterrent to speculation is apt to
change over time depending on a variety of other factors influencing
speculation in Vermont land. When the land market is overcharged,
as it has been in recent years, the imposition of the tax may work to
discourage some investors who would otherwise seek to profit from
short-term, high-yield transactions. In this situation, the state can
hardly lose. If the tax discourages some speculators, it has accomplished its regulatory purpose; if others are not discouraged, it generates money for state purposes. To the extent that the land boom tends
to abate from its present level or that more effective land use regulation measures are enacted and enforced, the regulatory feature of the
tax is likely to become less influential.
One of the important regulatory functions of the tax is to check
increases in land prices. Factors such as the energy crisis and the
availability of lending money may seriously affect future growth of
the second home industry in Vermont, making it difficult to ascertain
clearly the tax's effect on the market value of land. During the period
of May to October 1973, the value of real estate sales increased 10
percent over the same period of the previous year before the tax took
effect. Included in this 1973 calculation are many of the sales which
took place in the interval before the effective date of taxation, when a
rush of sales to avoid the tax resulted in the largest number of land
sales in a single month in Vermont's history. Even with these sales included, however, the percentage increase in 1973 is lower than for
88. Rutland Herald, Sept. 19, 1973, at I.
89. A speculator who held several parcels of land at the time the tax was enacted
has said: "There are several we just would not have bought knowing that the capital
gains tax would have been passed." He felt that he was "stuck" with holding other
parcels longer than he would like. Vermont Times. July 1973. at 5. col. 2.
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the same period in the two preceding years: 21 percent in 1972 and
45 percent in 1971. 90 The long-term trend is yet to be discerned,
though it is the opinion of the Vermont Commissioner of Taxes that
the tax will have the effect of stabilizing or decreasing the market
value of land.9 1
C.

Tax Evasion Possibilities

As long as the land boom continues, speculators may try to avoid
the effect of the tax by passing it on to consumers. A study of the
impact the tax is likely to have on large-scale developers indicates that
they may be able to overcome its effect by a 6 to 8 percent increase in
the selling price of developed units.92 Since only 8 to 10 percent of the
sales price of an average house is attributable to land, 93 it is understandable that a developer might be able to pass an additional land
cost on to the consumer by a price increase. In the case of a land speculator, however, the percentage of land cost of the total cost is much
higher, if not 100 percent. Whether the tax imposed, which may average 30 to 40 percent of the land cost, can be passed on by speculators
will depend entirely on the elasticity of the market. If the present tax
rates are not high enough to prevent the tax from being passed on, it
may be necessary to increase them in order to achieve the desired deterrent effect.
A related issue is whether speculators will be able to avoid the tax
altogether. In Vermont several potential loopholes have already been
foreclosed by state tax regulations. For example, the obvious way to
avoid a transfer tax on property would be through granting leaseholds. The regulations implementing the Vermont land gains tax
specify that: "Leases are not subject to the Land Gains Tax. However,
a 99 year or longer lease will be treated as a transfer of fee interest, as

90. Statistics provided by Vermont Department of Taxes, on file at Washington
Law Review.
91. Interview with Robert G. Lathrop, note 85 supra. For an economist's prediction
that land value increment taxation ought to have the effect of depressing land prices,
see D. NETZER, EcONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX 12-13 (1966).
92. R. Adams, M. Caulfield, J. Greene, C. Kanach, A Study of the Vermont Land
Gains Tax, November 30, 1973 (unpublished paper written for Public Policy Seminar
at Amos Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth, on file at Washington Law Review).
93. Interview with Hazel F. Weiler, Tax Field Examiner, Vermont Department of
Taxes, in Montpelier, Vermont, December 10, 1973.
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will perpetual leases, and will be subject to the Land Gains Tax." 94
"Leases with options to purchase are treated as installment sales if any
portion of the rent is to be applied against the purchase price." 95
Thus, the types of leases which could be most useful to the speculator
are also taxable as sales under the land gains tax.
A speculator might try to avoid the tax by artificially increasing his
holding period beyond six years through "tacking" or its equivalent.
For example, he could enter into joint ownership with a farmer from
whom he would otherwise buy outright; when the land was resold, the
farmer's individual holding period would be tacked on to the joint
ownership holding period for purposes of the tax. A Vermont regulation indicates, however, that holding periods in the case of joint ownership will be considered to run as of the date joint ownership originated, :16 so that a speculator could gain no advantage from this
scheme.
Another possible means of avoiding or reducing the bite of the tax
would be to increase either the cost basis or the amount of selling expenses, thus decreasing the realized gain to which the applicable tax
rate is applied. An issue of considerable interest to developers and
subdividers who sell a number of lots as part of a single project is
whether they can deduct marketing costs attributable to the development as a whole by allocating these costs among their lots and deducting a fraction of them as a selling expense from the gain realized
on each separate parcel sold. The Vermont Department of Taxes,
however, has promulgated a regulation which provides that only costs
which are "directly connected with the sale of a particular parcel" are
deductible from the gross consideration as selling expenses." 7 As a
result, marketing costs for a whole development are not deductible in
determining the amount taxable from the gain realized on each lot.
Developers and speculators are likely to challenge this regulation in
litigation, since the ability to deduct these costs could lighten considerably the effect of the land gains tax. However, a significant purpose of
the tax is to prevent the market price of land from being dispropor-

94.

Vt. Land Gains Tax Reg. § 1.10004(a)-2 (1973).

95.

Id.§ 1.10008-2.

96. "In the case of partition when there is no consideration, the holding period
runs from the date ofjoint ownership." Id. § 1.10005(d)-5.
97. Id. § 1.10005(b)-(a).
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tionately increased by socially or governmentally created forces)s
and land marketing expenditures are one of these forces which increase the price of land. To allow such expenses to be deducted from
land gains would encourage speculators and developers to make such
expenditures in the hope of reducing taxable gains. Such encouragement could result in further increases in the price of land and would
seriously undermine the effectiveness of the tax. For this reason, such
deductions should be disallowed.
D.

Suggestions for Improvement

Two issues deserve consideration by state legislatures considering
enactment of a land gains tax similar to Vermont's: adjustment for
inflation and the distinction between land and structures. The Vermont scheme offers no protection to the seller from taxation of inflationary increases in land value. Such a safeguard is considered essential to the taxation of land value increments where taxation occurs at
infrequent intervals.9 9 The argument may be made that since six years
is the maximum period of increment taxation in Vermont, there is
little danger that inflation would represent a significant portion of taxable gains. It may be further argued that the Vermont land gains tax
rates as presently established allow for inflation by decreasing with
length of holding periods; i.e., the maximum rate of tax for land held
5 to 6 years is only 10 percent, so that while the effective rate of taxation on noninflationary gains may actually be higher, the proportion
of value attributable to inflation is probably not captured by the tax.
A reason for not having a safeguard against inflation is simplicity and
efficiency of administration. However, the purposes of taxing speculative land gains are not served by taxing increases which do not flow
from speculation, and such taxation may impose an unjust obligation
on a seller. Just as costs of improvements to land are added to the cost
basis so that they are not taxable, 0 0 and selling expenses are deductible

98. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
99. Taxation of Land Value Increases,supra note 8, at 13; Woodruff, Assessment
Standards: Highest and Best Use as a Basis for Land Appraisal and Assessment, in
THE PROPERTY TAX AND ITS ADMINISTRATION 181 (D. Lynn ed. 1969).
100. "Basis is determined under the Internal Revenue Code rules and is the initial cost plus improvements to the land such as putting in roads, sidewalks, sewer sys-

tems, water systems, etc." Vt. Land Gains Tax Reg. § 1.10005(a)- 1 (1973).

1181

Washington Law Review

Vol. 49: 1159, 1974

before the gains are taxed,"" a deduction for inflationary increase
should be made before the appropriate tax rate is applied to gains. The
costs of administering such a safeguard may overshadow the inequities
of leaving it out in particular cases, such as under the Vermont scheme.
Nonetheless, Vermont should seriously study the economics of supplementing its tax with such a measure, and any system of land gains
taxation based on intervals longer than six years surely should include
0 2
a provision for inflation.1
The most troublesome issue encountered so far in the administration of the tax in Vermont is the allocation of gains between land and
structures where both are sold together.' 03 As originally drafted and
introduced into the Vermont legislature, the land gains tax was designed to apply to all real property, not just land. 0 4 Under such a
scheme, allocating gains between land and structures would not be
necessary, since all short-term property gains would be taxable. The
regulatory features of the tax would be directed toward short-term
speculation in the overall property market rather than primarily in the
market for undeveloped land, and the revenue-generating powers of
the tax would be broadened markedly. If one purpose of the tax is to
recapture unearned gain for the benefit of society, such gain from all
property should be recaptured rather than only from land.10 5 The Vermont legislature has limited the tax to land, but in the future it may
choose to enlarge both the tax base and the regulatory effect by expanding the tax into a broader real property gains tax.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Vermont land gains tax represents a promising new approach
to combatting a number of social and economic problems resulting
101.
In determining the amount realized, the gross consideration paid to the
seller is to be reduced by those selling expenses which are capital in nature and
which are directly connected with the sale of a particular parcel. Thus. legal fees.
surveying costs, sales commissions and the like actually paid to the extent directly related to the sale of a particular parcel. can reduce the amount realized.
Id. § 1.10005(b)-l(a).
102. While the capital gains provisions of the Internal Revenue Code do not prevent taxation of inflationary gains, a strong argument may be made that they should.
Comment, The Feasibility of Adjusting for Inflation in Conputing Taxable Incone,
49 WASH. L. REv. 873 (1974).
103. Interview with Hazel F. Weiler. supra note 93.
104. H-155, § 10002(a)(unenacted Vermont bill, 1973 Sess.).
10i. Taxation of'Land Value ncrea.se.%, ,upra note 8, at 13.
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from uncontrolled land speculation. Other states, like Washington,
with large amounts of undeveloped recreational land should consider
adopting this approach. The tax should exert a stabilizing effect on
land prices and property taxes, inhibit the premature conversion of
agricultural and open space land to developed use, and prevent imperfect land market forces from leading to the inevitable destruction of
the state's pastoral landscape. It is intended to serve many of the same
functions of more traditional land use taxation and regulation measures, but will have a broader reach than current use-value assessment
schemes in inhibiting the conversion of open land to developed use.
By decreasing the level of predevelopment speculation generally, it
will complement existing land use regulation measures. In addition,
the tax will provide a new source of state revenue. It will recapture the
unearned increment in short-term speculative land sales and, at the
same time, shift some of the social costs of unplanned growth back to
the speculator.
The tax is clearly constitutional. It does not run afoul of the fourteenth amendment's prohibition against discriminatory classifications
by distinguishing between short and long-term speculation because
this classification is directly related to the underlying social and economic problems which the scheme is designed to alleviate. Nor does
the tax violate the prohibitions 6f the due process clause against confiscation and retroactive application.
The first year's experience with the tax indicates that it will be at
least moderately effective both in generating revenue and in deterring
short-term speculation. States contemplating enactment of a similar
tax scheme should consider carefully the possibility of including a
mechanism for dealing with inflation and the desirability of taxing
gains on structures as well as land.
Mary Miles Teachout
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